UNDP and ocean governance by Kirk, EA
 1 
UNDP and Ocean Governance Chapter 
4 IMLI Treatise 
Elizabeth A. Kirk* 
Introduction 
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), at first glance, may 
appear to be an unusual institution to include within a treatise on ocean 
governance. Its vision is “to help countries achieve the simultaneous eradication 
of poverty and significant reduction of inequalities and exclusion”.1 One might 
assume that an organization with the word “development” in its title will not be 
focused on issues to do with the marine environment and ocean governance. 
Indeed the literature on the law of the sea shows little reference to the role of the 
UNDP in ocean governance. This may also be because the UNDP does not 
immediately appear to have played a direct role in the establishment of legal 
regimes relating to the oceans.  
 
UNDP's role is to help build developing State capacity. While its aims have been 
modified across time, so that at present it is focused on assisting with delivery of 
the Millennium Development Goals, its key role has remained the same – to help 
build developing State capacity.  In this it plays a facilitative role – looking for 
best practice to share, bringing potential partners together to work on projects, 
acting as a conduit for funding2 and providing policy advice. What law 
anticipates is institution building with concrete examples of the UNDP (or any 
given actor) developing a treaty regime, or norms, principles or policies. UNDP’s 
activities do not easily fit with this model and so are easily overlooked by law 
and legal academics as it does not appear to play a direct role in establishing 
treaty regimes. UNDP has, however, been a key player in establishing some of the 
newer regimes: regimes dealing with Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs). When 
one reviews UNDP’s work in this area, the rather limited discussion of it in the 
context of ocean governance begins to appear odd. 
 
The oddity of the fact that UNDP appears to have been overlooked by the 
literature is exacerbated by the fact that UNDP focuses on sustainable 
development, democratic governance and peace-building and climate and 
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disaster resilience.  All three of these areas have relevance for ocean governance, 
and one might assume that this would have led to UNDP being discussed to a 
greater degree than it has in the existing literature. It may be, however, that the 
fact that UNDP’s contribution to ocean governance does not fit with traditional 
approaches to ocean governance obscures it from view. Whereas, for example, 
the law of the sea starts from the premise that governance is tied to 
jurisdictional rights, UNDP’s approach to ocean governance starts from the 
premise that governance is attached to ecosystems.  Thus the role played by 
UNDP is made doubly challenging for law by the fact that the regimes it 
facilitates follow neither jurisdictional lines, nor disciplinary constraints.  Nor 
indeed do they follow sector specific approaches. Instead UNDP has been 
engaged in the establishment of interdisciplinary and transnational governance 
mechanisms (though not every mechanism is transnational). The route to their 
establishment has followed a regime building approach – starting with soft law 
agreements and moving through the building of consensus around particular 
norms and courses of action to, at times, the adoption of binding treaties.  In the 
initial stages these are regimes that lawyers are less likely to feel comfortable 
with and which some would argue do not count as “proper legal” regimes.  As 
will be demonstrated below, they are, without doubt, however, oceans 
governance regimes. 
 
This paper begins with a discussion of the history of UNDP and its basic 
approach to ocean governance– exploring the way in which its history has 
shaped UNDP’s relationship with ocean governance. The second substantive 
section discusses the UNDP’s current and former activities relating to ocean 
governance and the paper finishes with the conclusions and a brief discussion of 
next steps. 
 
History of UNDP and Basic Approach to Governance 
 
The United Nations General Assembly established the UNDP in 1965 in a process 
that saw the UN Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance merged with the 
UN Special Fund. These origins give some insight into the UNDP’s personality 
and objectives. It is, like all the UN programmes, financed through voluntary 
contributions. Its focus is on the provision of technical assistance to aid the 
socio-economic development of States (and regions) and oceans are but one of 
the areas upon which the UNDP directs its attention. UNDP’s broader remit 
focuses on helping “countries achieve the simultaneous eradication of poverty 
and significant reduction of inequalities and exclusion.”3 Its work spans both 
marine and terrestrial ecosystems and is focused on those activities or issues 
that aid or impede reductions in poverty, inequality or exclusion. In other words, 
UNDP is not concerned with such things as the protection of biodiversity, or the 
protection of the marine environment per se. It will only address these issues if 
they are relevant to achieving its wider objectives. One may assume that this 
narrow focus would be problematic in that it would prevent UNDP from 
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engaging with the full range of issues pertinent to ocean governance. As will be 
demonstrated in the next section, however, that does not appear to be the case. 
The focus does shape UNDP’s activities, but it does not appear to hinder its 
engagement with ocean governance. UNDP appears instead to have recognized 
the linkages between, for example, conservation of biodiversity and the 
eradication of poverty. That it has done so is quite remarkable when one 
considers the objectives that underpin UNDP’s work:  
1. Development should be inclusive of all 
2. Democratic governance systems should be strong enough to meet the 
demands of citizens to participate in them 
3. Gender inequality should be reduced more quickly than currently 
happens 
4. Institutions to ensure universal access to basic services should be 
strengthened within countries. 
5. The risks of conflict and of natural disasters should be lowered 
6. After any conflict or disaster sustainable development pathways should 
be quickly returned to 
7. Poverty, inequality and exclusion, are prioritized in policy debates at all 
levels. 
These objectives may be described as the overarching principles that UNDP 
brings to any project. To some degree they meet the objectives for ocean 
governance set out in this project.  For example, they technically satisfy the first 
objective of ocean governance as defined in this project – that is “the 
establishment of overriding principles and objectives relevant to maintain 
productive socio-ecological systems” and should also “ensure that societal 
interests are fairly represented in decision making”, but they can in no way be 
described as being designed to ensure the implementation of UNCLOS’s 
objectives.  That said, it is possible to see a fit between UNDP’s objectives and 
some of UNCLOS’s.  Thus the aim to reduce gender inequality fits with UNCLOS’s 
objective of promoting “the equitable … utilization of … resources”.4 Similarly, 
UNDP’s objective of lowering the risk of natural disasters and conflicts, maps to 
UNCLOS’s objective of promoting “the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans”.5  
 
UNDP’s objectives do not, however, particularly promote environmental 
concerns and, on the face of it, only a few of the elements of ocean governance 
identified in this project appear to be directly addressed by UNDP.  This may 
mean that UNDP is a long way from following an approach that is also utilized by 
other institutions. Thus, for example, the UNDP’s approach does not appear, at 
first sight, to address any of the following: develop policies and regulatory 
frameworks; harmonize individual, sectoral and societal perspectives; 
maintaining coherence across jurisdictional, space and time scales; defining the 
rules for allocation of power, resources and benefits; ensuring interaction with 
other governance systems; enforcing decisions and regulations; and, maintaining 
                                                        




the capacity to learn and change. As will be demonstrated in the following 
section, UNDP has, however, been able to embrace environmental issues and 
undertake a range of actions, which do map to both the conception of ocean 
governance presented in this project and UNCLOS’s objectives. That it has been 
able to do so is due to one of its most important characteristics. Throughout its 
history UNDP has not been constrained by its official remit. Instead, UNDP has 
taken a pragmatic approach – taking action even when that action did not fit with 
its standard remit.  For example, it provided assistance through the Programme 
of Assistance to the Palestinian People – repairing and rebuilding roads, 
hospitals and other buildings. This has been done despite the fact that normally 
the implementation of UNDP projects is delegated to other agencies or in country 
bodies. In this instance its top official, Mark Malloch Brown, recognised that 
there was no alternative body able to implement the required projects and so 
sanctioned UNDP’s actions.6 UNDP has also tended to be “ahead of the curve” in 
working out which approaches and policies will work and which will not as 
compared to other international organisations. Thus it realised early on that 
development had to be environmentally sustainable and democratic if it was to 
be effective.7 This willingness to embrace new approaches underpins UNDP’s 
current approach to ocean governance and its focus on LMEs in particular.  
 
One may question why it is that UNDP has been so willing to embrace new 
approaches where other organisations have perhaps been more restrained in 
their approach. In part UNDP’s ability to change is due to the fact that it lacks a 
core or fixed epistemic community. It functions more in the fashion of a 
consultancy firm – pulling in experts or cooperating with other agencies as 
required – than as an agency with a fixed theoretical root in the way that, for 
example, the World Bank functions. This means then that UNDP operates on the 
basis of “incompletely theorized agreement” and because theorization is 
incomplete it is possible for UNDP to change course relatively easily.8 Thus, in 
approaching ocean governance, UNDP has not brought with it a preconceived 
method of working. It has instead been able to develop a method to fit the 
problems.  In other words, UNDP has proved to be less constrained by the 
transaction costs associated with switching course9 than other organisations 
may be, because it does not have quite such a fixed course to follow.  Had UNDP 
followed the same method of working as other organisations it would likely have 
adopted a fixed view of what is meant by development.  It could, for example, 
have chosen to view development as leading to greater efficiency, or as creating 
greater freedom for individuals or as creating growth.  Choosing between these 
meanings would have dictated the approach to development promoted by UNDP. 
                                                        
6 Craig N. Murphy The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way? 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp11-12. 
7 Murphy ibid p16. 
8 Murphy ibid p16 and pp.347-348. 
9 W. Brian Arthur “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by 
Historical Events” (1989) 99 Economic Journal  116; W. Brian Arthur, Increasing 
Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy (University of Michigan Press, 
1994);  E. Woerdman “Path-dependent Climate Policy: The history and future of 
emission trading in Europe” (2004) 14 European Environment 261  
 5 
Rather than choosing a particular definition of development, UNDP has tended to 
steer a path between development as efficiency and development as freedom.  
This has enabled it to tailor its approach to the particular project in question. 
Thus in some contexts UNDP has provided advice to governments, in others it 
has worked with local stakeholders and in others it has done both.  
 
This history is key when considering UNDP’s approach to ocean governance. 
While in theory UNDP does not have a leading role to play in this area, it has in 
fact played such a role. Once again it has stepped outside of its remit and taken a 
flexible approach to the meaning of development. As will be demonstrated, 
UNDP has taken on the role of coordinating action and it has focused on capacity 
building – both for local actors and for States. As such its role and activities may 
not have been immediately obvious to those looking at actors active in ocean 
governance. Although acting as a coordinator on ocean governance may appear 
to be a large step outwith UNDP’s remit, it can also be understood as fitting 
within UNDP’s ways of working. UNDP has played the role of coordinator 
throughout its history - coordinating actions across the UN agencies where they 
have been working in the same area; leading in the establishment of new 
agencies and ensuring that development was a priority for all UN agencies.10  
Thus, it is a small step for UNDP to take on a coordinating role in oceans 
governance.  In this context then UNDP works with agencies, such as the Global 
Environment Fund (GEF) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). 
UNDP also works closely with States (both those in receipt of assistance and 
those that can help in the provision of assistance) and it partners on occasion 
with civil society actors. As seen, for example, in the cooperation between UNDP, 
UNOPS, GEF, and Conservation International in relation to the Sulu-Celebes 
Sea.11  In so doing the UNDP meets another element of the concept of ocean 
governance that underpins this research – ensuring “close cooperation by States, 
inter-governmental institutions and other actors”.  
 
Such cooperation both magnifies the ability of each agency to contribute to ocean 
governance and has the potential to reduce fragmentation in the approaches 
taken by different institutions and States to the same issues. For fragmentation 
to be reduced, or to put it another way, for harmonization of approaches to 
happen and institutions be able to work with each other effectively, they must be 
influenced to some degree by the governance objectives of those bodies they 
cooperate with.  This requirement of effective working may explain how it is that 
UNDP has come to see the linkages between its own primary objectives and the 
need to protect the marine environment and conserve marine biodiversity. For 
example, GEF focuses on mainstreaming biodiversity through  
 
 “developing policy and regulatory frameworks that remove perverse 
subsidies and provide incentives for biodiversity-friendly land and 
resource use that remains productive but that does not degrade 
biodiversity;  
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 spatial and land-use planning to ensure that land and resource use is 
appropriately situated to maximize production without undermining or 
degrading biodiversity;  
 improving and changing production practices to be more biodiversity 
friendly, with a focus on sectors that have significant biodiversity impacts 
(e.g., agriculture, forestry, fisheries, tourism, extractive industries);  
 piloting an array of financial mechanisms (e.g., certification, payment for 
environmental services, access and benefit sharing agreements) to help 
incentivize actors to change current practices that may be degrading 
biodiversity.”12  
For GEF and UNDP to work together effectively, the manner in which each 
implements their own objectives must, inevitably, be influenced by the 
objectives of the partner institution. In this case, the most obvious way in which 
GEF’s objectives may influence UNDP might be through elaborating on UNDP’s 
fifth objective: that the risks of conflicts and natural disasters should be lowered. 
By protecting the environment, the risks of certain natural disasters, such as 
stock collapses, occurring will be lowered. Similarly the objectives should help 
reduce conflicts over resources, by ensuring that they are managed effectively. 
Like the UNDP objectives, GEF’s objectives also support the implementation of 
UNCLOS’s objectives, from those focused on management of fisheries such as the 
provisions of Part V to those protecting the environment such as Articles 192 
and 193. In some ways, however, GEF’s objectives reflect the provisions of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity13 (CBD) more than the objectives in UNCLOS. 
For example, the provisions of part V of UNCLOS on fishing in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) are more focused on ensuring optimum utilization of the 
resource than on providing incentives to ensure that activities do not degrade 
biodiversity.  By contrast, these provisions fit well with the objectives and 
provisions of the CBD. The four elements outlined above are encapsulated in the 
objectives of the CBD on the conservation of biodiversity and sustainable use of 
its components.14 Removing perverse incentives and incentivizing land-use 
practices that are biodiversity friendly, follows the CBD’s provisions on incentive 
measures found in its Article 11. Situating resource use so as not to undermine 
biodiversity reflects the ethos if not the language of the obligation to establish 
protected areas under Article 8 of the CBD. This, coupled with the fact that UNDP 
appears to focus more on equality of access and preservation of biodiversity than 
on preserving jurisdictional interests and ensuring optimum utilization of 
resources points to a potential divergence between the approach to ocean 
governance taken by the UNDP/GEF and approaches that may be thought to 
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accord more closely with the provisions of UNCLOS.  
 
The apparent divergence of approach between UNCLOS on the one hand and that 
of UNDP/GEF when coupled with the history and general objectives of UNDP 
may explain why it is that the role of UNDP in ocean governance tends not to be 
discussed greatly. Yet as this section indicates, there is a fit between UNDP’s 
work and ocean governance. That fit is explored more fully in the following 
section. 
 
Current and Former Activities 
 
Introduction: From Jurisdiction and Sector Specific Approaches to Large 
Marine Ecosystems 
 
The role of UNDP in ocean governance is best understood by contrasting it with 
traditional legal approaches to ocean governance.  The law of the sea has largely 
developed along sector-specific lines. For example, within the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea specific laws apply to fisheries,15 different ones to the control 
of pollution16 and another set to navigational rights.17 This separation of 
functions is mirrored in the international institutions tasked with overseeing the 
development and implementation of governance regimes applicable to these 
areas. The IMO oversees navigation, regional seas bodies address marine 
pollution issues while regional fisheries management organisations govern 
either species specific fisheries or region specific fisheries. This is an approach 
that lawyers are comfortable with as it mirrors the legal approach to socio-
economic affairs in general – breaking life down into sectors of activity such as 
criminal law, contract law, property law and so on. But as lawyers know these 
areas are interdependent, the distinction of subjects artificial – property law is 
dependent upon contract law to function; the law of theft is predicated on rights 
under property law being breached. In the same way the artificiality of the 
sectoral distinctions in ocean law is accepted by lawyers and by those engaged in 
oceans governance activities.  The acknowledgment that this artificial division is 
problematic in practice has led to more coordinated approaches within 
individual States and to some collaboration between international bodies to 
provide a more integrated approach to ocean governance. OSPAR provides one 
of the best examples of such integration – it cooperates with the neighbouring 
regional sea programme – HELCOM,18 and has Memoranda of Understanding 
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with a neighbouring regional fisheries body19 and with the International Seabed 
Authority in relation to the deep-sea bed.20 These efforts go a long way to 
address fragmentation, but they are still limited, or, rather, limiting. The process 
of developing MOUs may be likened to forming chain-links connecting one 
regime to another. In this way these linked regimes may address pertinent 
ecosystem issues, but it is as likely that they will be unable to address relevant 
ecosystems as a whole rather than as a sum of connected issues. Thus gaps in 
how the ecosystem is managed are likely to exist. 
 
A different form of disconnection between ocean governance regimes and the 
ocean ecosystems is caused by the jurisdictional arrangements in the law of the 
sea which grant States sovereignty or sovereign rights in their territorial sea,21 
exclusive economic zone,22 continental shelf23 and (as appropriate) archipelagic 
waters.24 These zones may, but frequently do not accord with oceans 
ecosystems25 and so management measures adopted by States, even if well 
designed for the particular ecosystem, may once again fail to be fully effective as 
they can only be applied in that portion of the ecosystem within the State’s 
jurisdiction. The results can be both problems in managing oceans resources26 
and disputes between States.27 Collaborative efforts between neighbouring 
States or with/within regional organisations may ameliorate such problems, but 
are unlikely to completely eradicate them, for the reasons alluded to above. 
 
                                                        
19 See, for example, Memorandum of Understanding between the North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission and the OSPAR Commission, 2008, 
<www.ospar.org/site/assets/files/1357/mou_neafc_ospar.pdf>. 
20 Memorandum of Understanding with the International Seabed Authority (the 
Authority)  OSPAR 10/23/1, Annex 12. 
21 UNCLOS Part II. 
22 UNCLOS Part V. 
23 UNCLOS Part VI. 
24 UNCLOS Part IV. 
25 See E.A. Kirk  2015 “The Ecosystem Approach and the Search for An Objective 
and Content for the Concept of Holistic Ocean Governance” 46 Ocean Development 
and International Law Kirk;  E.A. Kirk 1999 “The Mismatch of Jurisdictional Zone 
and Ecosystems” 8 Review of International and European Community 
Environmental Law  pp.67-72. 
26 See Churchill, R. R. “The Management of Shared Fish Stocks: The Neglected 
“Other” Paragraph of Article 63 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea” in A. 
Strati, M. Gavouneli and N. Skourtos (eds), Unresolved Issues and New Challenges 
to the Law of the Sea (Martinus, Nijhoff 2006), pp. 3-19. 
27 See for example, Icelandic Fisheries Case (UK v Iceland) ICJ Rep (1974) 3 
reference the Icelandic Fisheries case and the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v 
Canada) ICJ Rep (1998) 432.  Se also P.G.G. Davies, “The EC/Canadian Fisheries 
Dispute in the Northwest Atlantic” (1995) 44 ICLQ pp. 927-939; D. Freestone, 
“Canada and the EU Reach Agreement to Settle the Estai Dispute” (1995) 10 
TIJMCL pp. 397-411; and C.C. Joyner & A. Alvarez von Gustedt, “The 1995 Turbot 
War: Lessons for the Law of the Sea” (1996) 11 TIJMCL pp. 425-458. 
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Many of the initiatives supported by UNDP appear, however, to champion a 
different approach focussing instead on the concept of LMEs or on integrated 
coastal zone management.28 There are around 65 such LMEs in the world. 
For example, the Guinea Current LME was, in 
2009, estimated to give rise to more than $49,941.4 million worth of goods 
(fisheries, minerals etc.).30 While these areas provide significant revenue streams 
they are often also under significant threat from pollution, over fishing and 
illegal and unregulated fishing.31 
UNDP in conjunction with other bodies such as GEF use the concept of LMEs to 
promote “sustainable, ecosystem-based management”. 32 The approach is also “in 
line with Chapter 17 of Agenda 21”.33 As such, t not drawn 
with an eye to ocean governance per se, but upon those areas that contribute 
most to our socio-economic systems. The boundaries are therefore 
                                                        
28 The discussions in this paper focus primarily on the management of large 
marine ecosystems, in part due to constraints on space and in part because it has 
proved difficult to find sufficient materials relating to UNDP’s role in relation to 
integrated coastal zone management on which to base any analysis. 
29 UNDP-GEF “International Waters Delivering Results” (UNDP, 2016) p.9. 
30 N.A. Chukwuone, C.N. Ukwe, A. Onugu, C.A. Ibe “Valuing the Guinea Current 
Large Marine Ecosystem: Estimates of Direct Output Impact of Relevant Marine 
Activities” (2009) 52 Ocean & Coastal Management 189–196. See also, for 
example, Mary Power and Anama Solofa “The Pacific Islands Regional Ocean 
Policy and the Framework for a Pacific Oceanscape: ‘Many islands – one ocean’” 
chapter 19 in David VanderZwaag, Biliana Cicin-Sain and Miriam C. Balgos (eds) 
Routledge Handbook of National and Regional Ocean Policies (Taylor and 
Francis 2015) p 504 for details of the value fisheries, tourism etc. around the 
Pacific Islands. 
31 See for example, Indumathie  Hewawasam, Bernice  McLean and with 
contributions from Leopoldo Maraboli and Magnus Ngoile, ‘Ocean and Coastal 
Policy Processes in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issues, Opportunities, and Strategic 
Options ’ in David  VanderZwaag, Biliana  Cicin-Sain and Miriam C. Balgos (eds), 
Routledge Handbook of National and Regional Ocean Policies (chapter 21  p.543, 
Taylor and Francis 2015) 
32 GEF, UNDP, UNU-INWEH, IW Learn “From Coast to Coast: Celebrating 20 Years 
of Transboundary Management of Our Shared Oceans” (GEF, 2015) p.6 
33 Hewawasam, McLean, Maraboli and Ngoile supra n. 31 at p.554. 
34 “From Coast to Coast” supra n. 32 p.96. 
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in which most competition between users occurs. They are therefore the 
most complicated areas to manage. 35 For example, while the resources of the 
Guinea Current LME are extremely important for the local population, some are 
the target of, at times unregulated, industrialized fishing which reduces the 
availability of fish for the local population.36  In these circumstances the 
governance arrangements become extremely important. The approach promoted 
by UNDP working with GEF and other institutions is to assist the coastal States to 
develop governance arrangements through the Trandsboudary Diagnostic 
Analysis/Strategic Action Programme (TDA/SAP) process. As described below, 
the process generally follows a regime building approach and it has the potential 
to not only ensure that UNCLOS’s objectives are met, but that a range of ocean 
governance objectives are met – from harmonizing societal and sectoral 
perspectives, to maintaining productive socio-ecological systems. 
 
Developing Principles, Objectives and Regulatory Frameworks: Following a 
Regime Building approach in the development of oceans governance 
regimes 
 
The Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis/Strategic Action Programme (TDA/SAP) 
planning approach - was developed through GEF and adopted by UNDP.  The 
process fits well with understandings of regime building37 according to which 
States first develop shared understandings.  These shared understandings create 
space in which a common practice may emerge, with that practice gradually 
crystallising into binding norms over time. The TDA/SAP process was developed 
to help neighbouring States to work together over transboundary issues – issues 
which often result in disputes.38  It is designed as “a multi-country, long-term 
integrated planning approach that helps governments to prioritize issues, 
identify barriers and agree upon and implement regional and national 
governance reforms and investments aimed at addressing the root causes of 
                                                        
35 Hanling Wang “Ecosystem Management and Its Application to Large Marine 
Ecosystems: Science, Law, and Politics” (2004) 35 ODIL 41074 at 46 
36 Chika N. Ukwe, Chidi A. Ibe, Kenneth Sherman “A Sixteen-Country Mobilization 
for Sustainable Fisheries in the Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem” (2006) 
49 Ocean & Coastal Management 385–412 
37 See, for example, J. Brunnée and S. J. Toope, ‘Environmental security and 
freshwater resources: ecosystem regime building’ 91 The American Journal of 
International Law 26-59 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, ‘International Law 
and Constructivism: Elements of An Interactional Theory of International Law’ 
39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 19-7 Thomas M Franck, The Power of 
Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press 1990 A. Hasenclever, P. 
Mayer and V. Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge 
University Press 1997 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International 
Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ 52 International Organization 887-917 
38 GEF-UNDP “Catalyzing Ocean Finance II: Methodologies and Case Studies” 
(UNDP, 2012) p.11 
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aquatic ecosystem degradation.”39   The process begins with the TDA - a scientific 
analysis of the state of the environment and issues with it.  This analysis creates 
the space in which shared understandings can arise.  For example, in the 
Caribbean Large Marine Ecosystem Project three TDAs were carried out - one for 
each of the LMEs that is important to the production of fisheries in the region – 
coral reef ecosystems, pelagic ecosystem and the continental shelf ecosystem.  
The TDAs identified certain common threats - pollution, over fishing and habitat 
degradation – and that the impact of these threats were exacerbated by 
weaknesses in the governance systems and in the way those systems are 
implemented.40 The SAP that followed built on these findings. Similarly, the Sulu-
Celebes Sea SAP addressed the weak governance and gaps in governance found 
in the TDA by including recommendations to strengthen existing institutions and 
to ensure that coordination across institutions was addressed41 and the South 
Pacific Regional Environment Programme reformed its structure following its 
TDA/SAP process.42 
 
The TDA process enables the States involved to pinpoint problem issues to be 
addressed. The SAP then is a political document43 in which the parties identify 
the priority areas for action. It demonstrates a general agreement as to the 
principles that should guide the management of the LME. Both the conduct of the 
TDA and the implementation of the SAP enable a practice to develop around 
these priorities and principles and from there it can be possible for the parties to 
go on to develop binding norms in the form of a treaty.  For example, the 
Benguela Current States – Angola, Namibia and South Africa – approached UNDP 
for assistance in developing cooperation in the mid-1990s. This led to a TDA 
being carried out (and completed by 1999). The findings of the TDA formed the 
basis for a SAP to be adopted in 2002. Implementation of the initial SAP led the 
States to the adoption of the Benguela Current Convention, signed in 2013.44 To 
ensure entrenchment of the norms agreed in the Benguela Current Convention 
UNDP has been providing support for implementation of the BCC SAP through 
the reform of law and policy at national and regional levels since 2015.45  
 
                                                        
39 UNDP “Support to the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 14” p. 
6< http://un.info.np/Net/NeoDocs/View/6140> accessed 27 October 2016  
40 Similar findings have been reported in other areas.  See, for example, Sulu-
Celebes Sea Sustainable Fisheries Management Project 2014 “Report on the 
Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis of the Sulu-Celebes (Sulawesi) Large Marine 
Ecosystem”. 
41 Sulu Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion Tri-National Committee 2013 “Strategic 
Action Program for the Sulu-Celebes Sea Large Marine Ecosystem”. 
42 Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme “SPREP Annual 
Report: 2012” (SPREP, 2013) 
43 GEF-UNDP 2012 supra n.38 p.11. 
44 The Benguela Current Convention between the Government of the Republic of 
Angola and the Government of the Republic of Namibia and the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa 2013 (entered into force 10 December 2015) < 
http://www.benguelacc.org/> accessed 27 October 2016. 
45 “From Coast to Coast” supra n. 32. 
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Whether a treaty or a SAP alone is adopted, the net result is that the GEF/UNDP 
process meets the ocean governance objectives of developing policies and 
regulatory frameworks for ocean governance and of maintaining coherence 
across jurisdictional, space and time scales.  Where a treaty is adopted, the 
objectives of defining the rules for allocation of power, resources and benefits 
may also be met. These, however, do not appear to be the immediate goals of the 
UNDP process. The focus is instead on bringing together States with either a 
poor record of cooperating together, or little record of cooperating in the 
particular area in question.  In this last - bring States together – the results of 
UNDP’s efforts have been quite remarkable. For example, under the GEF/UNDP 
Yellow Sea LME project China and the Republic of Korea worked together on 
LME assessment cruises. This was the first time they had conducted joint LME 
assessments.  The assessments then led to the agreement of a Strategic Action 
Programme to address ecosystem problems identified during the assessment 
cruises. The SAP contained some quite significant measures – agreement to 
reduce fishing effort by 30% and to reduce nutrient discharges by 10% every 
five years.46  Given the fact that China is a (rapidly) developing country, and 
given the relationship between these two States, these commitments to reduce 
fishing effort and nutrient discharges are highly significant. 
 
Similarly the Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East 
Asia (PEMSEA) evolved from a GEF/UNDP/IMO project - the Prevention and 
Management of Marine Pollution in the East Asian Seas (MPP-EAS) Project.  The 
UNDP/GEF through this (and other projects such as the GEF/UNDP Building 
Partnerships for the Environmental Protection and Management of the East 
Asian Seas and GEF/UNDP Implementation of Sustainable Development Strategy 
for the Seas of East Asia (SDS SEA)) facilitated cooperation between the States. 
This in turn enabled the members of PEMSEA to adopt the Sustainable 
Development Strategy for the region in 2003 (Sustainable Development Strategy 
for the Seas of East Asia SDS-SEA). In 2006 support for the implementation of the 
SDS-SEA was found in the establishment of the East Asian Seas (EAS) 
Partnership Council by the cooperating States.  The cooperation between States 
continued to strengthen to the extent that eight States recognised PEMSEA as an 
independent legal entity in 2009. Developments continued so that  
 
“in 2011, the PEMSEA Network of Local Governments for Sustainable 
Coastal Development (PNLG) adopted the Dongying Declaration by which 
the countries committed to ocean governance actions and targets; and, in 
2012, country partners adopted the Changwon Declaration, which serves 
as the region’s response to the Rio+20 outcomes by promoting the 
development of an ocean-based blue economy through strengthened 
implementation of the SDS-SEA.”47 
 
In addition, PEMSEA has facilitated the adoption of certain regional agreements 
such as the Framework Programme on Partnerships in Oil Spill Preparedness 
                                                        
46 Ibid p.7. 
47 Ibid p.45. 
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and Response in the Gulf of Thailand.48 These examples point to the development 
of regional regimes by focussing on the use of practice to develop shared 
understandings – the regime building approach. These shared understandings 
may also draw on existing understandings in global instruments,49 but the key 
element appears to be the creation of common understandings at the regional 
level.  
 
In keeping with UNDP’s flexible approach to development in general, the regime 
building approach is not the only way in which it promotes ocean governance.  A 
different approach was taken in the Caribbean Integrated Watershed and Coastal 
Area Management Programme. That programme addressed fragmentation in the 
approaches to ocean governance by the 21 States in the region caused in part by 
the wildly different economic capacities of the States, but also due to different 
cultural contexts. It helped ensure coherent approaches across jurisdictions and 
harmonize societal perspectives by ensuring interaction with the global 
governance systems. That interaction took the form of aid to countries to enable 
ratification of “key legal agreements such as the Protocol on Land-Based Sources 
of Pollution of the Cartegena Convention”.50  In the Black Sea a third approach 
appears to be taken – one in which cooperation on particular projects is given 
priority though these projects may be designed to support implementation of the 
existing Bucharest Convention.51 
 
All of these approaches cause some problems for lawyers in identifying UNDP’s 
efforts in ocean governance. In this context, the discussion of the development of 
ocean governance mechanisms in the lexicon of regime building points to the 
cause of the problem for lawyers. Although the  
 
 “LME approach promotes the creation of new and reformed institutions, 
the reform and implementation of marine resource management policies 
and legislation, and the leverage of public and private sector investment 
for LME restoration and protection”,52  
 
the institutional structures adopted tend not to follow the traditional 
institutional structures associated with oceans governance by lawyers. For 
                                                        
48 See Craig Forrest “State Cooperation in Combating Transboundary Marine 
Pollution in South East Asia” (2016) 30 Australia and New Zealand Maritime Law 
Journal 78 
49 Stella Regina Bernad and Chua Thia-Eng “”The Sustainable Development 
Strategy for the Seas of East Asia” Policy implications at local national and 
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Policies (Taylor and Francis 2015) p527 et seq. 
50 “From Coast to Coast” supra n.32 p.7. 
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http://archive.iwlearn.net/www.bsepr.org/www.bsepr.org/Text/Project/defaul
t.html . Bucharest Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against 
Pollution 1992 (1994) 1764 UNTS 4. 
52 “From Coast to Coast” supra n.32 p.6. 
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example, the GEF/UNDP Caribbean LME centred on a 10 year SAP agreed by 22 
States and focused on key issues for the region. The SAP is a non-binding soft law 
document, containing political, rather than legal commitments. A similar 
approach was followed in the GEF/UNDP supported Partnerships in Environmental 
Management for the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA).  PEMSEA adopted the 
Sustainable Development Strategy for the Seas of East Asia. The Strategy fits with 
the idea of establishing policies and a regulatory framework in that it provides a stage 
upon which policy development can take place. It also promotes the objective of 
maintaining productive socio-ecological systems through provision for an investment 
work package managed by the World Bank. This package is not just about investment 
to create jobs, but aims to protect the ecosystem through tackling coastal pollution.53 
Despite these fits with ocean governance objectives, the Strategy remains a soft law 
instrument and as such may not be recognised as having legal validity by parts of the 
legal academy.54  Similarly, the type of work undertaken by UNDP in the Caribbean 
and Black Sea do not fit with traditional legal notions of ocean governance activities. 
 
It is perhaps because of these types of approaches, and the fact that they lack 
formal legal structures, that UNDP’s work has attracted so little attention from 
legal academics. It might appear at first sight that this “antipathy” may also be 
mutual. UNDP’s work does not always draw in legal insights. For example, its 
work on global public goods, so central a concept to ocean governance, was 
absent contributions from lawyers.55 In reality, however, many of the projects 
with which the UNDP is involved focus on precisely the type of issues that legal 
discourse and ocean governance are concerned with.  For example, the 
UNDP/GEF supported Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem Programme 
was established with the aim of inter alia ensuring that a Benguela Current 
Commission (BCC) was set up to facilitate cooperation56 because there was an 
identified lack of governance structures in place. Indeed the “BCC constitutes the 
first fully institutionalized and operational intergovernmental, multi-sectoral 
LME commission in the world. It is also the first ever inter-governmental 
commission based on the LME concept for ocean governance”.57 Similarly, the 
UNDP/GEF supported the Pacific Islands Oceanic Fisheries Management Project, 
which ran from 2005-2011 and focused on the establishment of institutions of 
governance.58 It supported the participating States in the negotiation and 
adoption of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF 
Convention). The WCPF convention implements many of the provisions of the 
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement and was one of the first to do so. In addition the 
WCPF Commission has agreed MoUs with other RFMOs including the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission, the Commission for the Conservation of 
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54 See also, for example the Sulu Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion Tri-National 
Committee 2013 supra n.41. 
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Southern Bluefin Tuna, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission and the Commission 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.  In this way then it 
could be said that the UNDP/GEF action did not just work to strengthen and 
develop institutions at the regional level, but also to support and strengthen 
global instruments and institutions relevant to ocean governance.  
 
By supporting the adoption of legal instruments such as those described above, 
and in identifying weaknesses in existing governance structures, UNDP’s work 
promotes ocean governance in the sense understood by lawyers. It fits with the 
objective of establishing overriding principles and objectives to maintain 
productive socio-ecological systems and with the objective of harmonizing 
societal and sectoral perspectives. It also fits with the objective of maintaining 
coherence across jurisdictional and spatial scales and with the objective of 
ensuring interaction with other governance systems, but, as should be evident 
from the discussion above, it does not ensure that all of these objectives are met 
in every project.  Instead and in keeping with its flexible approach, UNDP adopts 
the objectives suited to the problem in question in each particular project. In this 
context, one of the key tasks that UNDP will have to address in most projects is 
capacity building. This is particularly so given UNDP’s focus on working with 
developing States. As might be anticipated UNDP’s work prioritizes learning and 
the capacity to change both in the form of training for actors and in terms of the 
creation of adaptive organisations.  
 
UNDP’s role in supporting the development of adaptive organisations again fits 
with the conception of regime building and, as might be anticipated, it is at its 
most obvious in relation to the SAP.  It is intended that the SAP be reviewed and 
revised at regular intervals59 as happened in, for example, the Benguela Current 
LME where the 2001 SAP was revised in 2009. A partial revision also took place 
for the period 2014/15 to 2018-19 when the causal chain analysis for the SAP 
was revised.60 On occasions these reviews lead to restructuring of the SAP or of 
the organisations charged with implementing it. As noted earlier, the Sulu-
Celebes Sea SAP addressed the weak governance and gaps in governance found 
in the TDA by including recommendations to strengthen existing institutions and 
to ensure that coordination across institutions was addressed61 and the South 
Pacific Regional Environment Programme reformed its structure following its 
SAP.62  
 
Training and capacity building is also built in to the SAP. For example the 2015-
19 SAP adopted by the Benguela Current Commission63 provides for oceans 
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61 Sulu Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion Tri-National Committee 2013 supra n. 41. 
62 “SPREP Annual Report: 2012” supra n.42. 
63 Benguela Current Commission, Strategic Action Programme 2015-2019:  A 
Coordinated Regional Approach to the Long-term Conservation, Protection, 
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capacity building in a variety of areas such as ocean governance and 
maintenance of marine transport facilities as strategic responses to the 
challenges outlined in the earlier chapters of the report:64  
 
“Training and capacity building to bolster sound environmental 
governance has also been at the forefront of the BCC’s agenda, while 
complementary initiatives include an extensive science program funded 
by the government of Norway, and a comprehensive training and capacity 
building initiative supported by Iceland.”65 
 
In addition, the Secretariat is tasked with coordinating capacity building 
programmes run jointly with external partners.66 Similar provisions are found 
elsewhere, such as in the draft Western Indian Ocean SAP.67 
 
UNDP also supports training in a number of ways unconnected to the SAP 
process. For example, it worked with collaborators to organize a course on 
conservation of coastal ecosystems in Cuba in 200868 and in 2012 UNDP and GEF 
launched a Clean Coast and Beach competition in the Lower Volga Delta to help 
educating and training of locals.69 It also works on the production of guidelines 
on implementation of policies. For example, it cooperated in the development of 
the Guidelines for Development of a National Ballast Water Management 
Strategy70 under the GloBallast programme. 
 
A further way in which UNDP’s work promotes regime building is through 
supporting fair representation in decision-making. UNDP’s approach to ocean 
governance actively engages stakeholders at various stages of the governance 
process. The TDA, which often forms the starting point for the project is designed 
to be “part of a process of engaging stakeholders through the initial TDA steps 
and the subsequent development of alternative solutions during the formulation 
of the SAP.”71  This means that “Stakeholder identification and consultation and 
studies of institutional capacity, governance, and investment are all essential 
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components of the TDA process.” 72  This process, bringing stakeholders and civil 
society more generally together with policy makers and experts in the process 
leading towards the adoption of the SAP is designed to ensure that sound science 
assists “policy making within a specific geographic location for an ecosystem-
based approach to management that can be used to engage stakeholders.”73 It 
also has the potential benefit of enabling common understandings to emerge in 
line with regime building. 
 
The process generally begins with a consultation with stakeholders, followed by 
a review of existing data. The next step is to gather and analyse any data 
necessary to fill gaps in the existing data. This is done through a four part 
modular process addressing: pollution and ecosystem health, productivity, fish 
and fisheries and socio economics. A fifth module addresses governance and 
feeds into the SAP process and review of it.74 Experts carry out the gathering and 
analysis of data, but at each stage of the process relevant stakeholders are 
invited to review and comment on the findings or proposals.75 For example, in 
the lead up to the adoption of the PEMSEA SDS-SEA consultations were held with 
national and regional stakeholders over a period of more than three years.76 
 
Although each TDA process is designed to follow the same process in terms of 
the five modules to be followed, the stakeholders involved will vary from one 
LME assessment to another to reflect the problem(s) on which the TDA/SAP 
process is focussed. Thus for example, the TDA for the Benguela Current LME 
brought together representatives from fishing (both industrial and artisanal), 
tourism, oil, gas and mining as well as representatives from port authorities, 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders more generally and experts 
drawn both from the region and internationally. By contrast the Humboldt 
Current LME engages primarily with artisanal fishermen and local communities 
as the TDA and SAP are focussed very much on the preservation of the anchovy 
fisheries. 
 
At first sight it may appear, however, that the process is not designed to support 
the emergence of shared understandings. The shaping of the stakeholder groups 
to reflect the problem on which the TDA is focussed, points to the TDA aiming 
not so much at participatory democracy77 as at ensuring that the decisions and 
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recommendations coming from it are based on the best information possible.78  
Thus there may be no concern with the understandings stakeholders take away 
from the process. This conclusion is supported by the fact that, in keeping with 
the processes used in most international organisations,79 decisions on how to 
respond to the problems identified in the TDA will often be left to the local States 
and regional bodies, as happened, for example, during the Caribbean LME 
TDA/SAP process.80 However, while this conclusion may apply generally to the 
TDA process, it is less applicable to the TDA/SAP process as a whole. The fifth 
module of the TDA/SAP process comprises an analysis of existing national, 
regional and international governance systems. It feeds directly into 
establishment or review of the SAP. The overarching objective of the fifth module 
is to establish where governance problems are arising. Part of this remit involves 
establishing formal allocation of power. Another part determines where the real 
power behind decision-making sits rather than the formal power. Once again, 
however, examples point to the focus being on decision-making power between 
States. For example, in the Caribbean LME project it was clear that while all 
States had formal power to participate in relevant organisations such as Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission the small island developing States 
would lack the capacity to do so. Those States were then given support through 
UNDP’s Pacific Oceanic Fisheries Management Project (OFMP) to ensure that 
they could participate and could have a real voice in the Commission’s 
decisions.81 The story is, however, somewhat different when one assesses the 
move from the TDA itself to the SAP. The first stage in the process draws on the 
stakeholders’ objectives for the ecosystem in question and results in the 
establishment of Ecological Quality Objectives.82 At the implementation stage 
again, stakeholders are actively involved. For example, local communities and 
stakeholders from the public and private sectors participate in the 
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implementation of the Benguela Current SAP83 and are active in the Caribbean 
LME.84 The Guinea Current SAP also provides for the continued involvement of 
stakeholders85 as does the Sulu-Celebes Sea.86  
 
What we can take from this then is that the TDA/SAP process begins with a 
process designed to gain the best quality information on which States can make 
decisions. At this point it helps engender common understandings between 
States from which norms of action may emerge. At the implementation stage 
participation is widened enabling the generation of common understandings 
across the community of stakeholders. Thus compliance with the aims of the SAP 
may be hoped to be improved and the emerging regime may be hoped to gain 
robustness. For example, the process leading to the PEMSEA SDS-SEA is credited 
with leading to the creation of a shared vision amongst the stakeholders.87 That 
is not to say that the process will be easy – there may substantial differences in 
the interests of different stakeholder groups. For example, the interests of 
stakeholders from South Africa, with the worlds 10th largest stock exchange,88 
may be very different from those from neighbouring Namibia.  
 
There is, however, at least one other way in which the TDA/SAP process 
promotes harmonization of societal interests. This is through the harmonization 
of policies across States, which is most clearly seen in the adoption of a regional 
approach to management of the particular LME. It would, however, be a stretch 
to say that the UNDP has provided particular guidance as to how harmonization 
should take place. While it does provide guidance on the issues the TDA should 
address89 and it does provide that the SAP is to implement measures to tackle the 
key issues identified in the TDA, such as policy or legislative development, it does 
not give further guidance than that.  Instead it is left to the participants of each 
TDA/SAP process to decide on issues to be harmonized and the way in which 
such harmonization should be achieved. UNDP’s approach has the benefit that it 
means processes can fit with the cultural norms of the region and can be tailored 
to fit with or complement (as appropriate) the approaches of existing 
management regimes in the region. Thus it enables some regions to proceed on 
the basis of political agreements to harmonize measures (such as PEMSEA) while 
others adopt binding agreements (such as the Benguela Current Convention.) 
Whichever approach is taken to the adoption of agreements – soft or hard law – 
UNDP’s efforts often lead to harmonization of a further sort. The agreements will 
often times embody certain key environmental principles such as the polluter 
pays and precautionary principles. For example, both the polluter pays and the 
precautionary principle are found in the Guinea Current SAP.90 In so doing, the 
UNDP sponsored projects not only ensure a consistent (or harmonized) 
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approach to ocean governance within and across regions, but that the regional 
approaches are consistent with global approaches. Thus minimising the 
possibility of fragmentation in ocean governance and increasing the possibility of 
harmonisation. 
 
UNDP also plays a role in global initiatives to harmonize approaches across 
States. Its activities range from working with other institutions to provide 
background papers for global events to leading the development of certain global 
initiatives. For example, it collaborated with the IOC/UNESCO, the IMO and the 
FAO in writing an inter-agency paper to aid preparation for the UN Conference 
on Sustainable Development (Rio+20).91 At the other end of the spectrum of 
activities is the GloBallast project, which the UNDP, GEF and IMO started in 2000 
to tackle the problem of invasive species carried by ship ballast water. “One of 
the most significant outcomes has been the adoption of the IMO International 
Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and 
Sediments”92 in 2004.  It provides a standardized way of dealing with ballast 
(and any invasive species) and will enter into force in September 2017.  
 
The GloBallast initiative demonstrates how effective efforts to both harmonize 
policies and involve stakeholders can be in achieving the desired governance 
results and in bringing additional benefits. Those involved in GloBallast realised 
that it could only be successful if industry (which could be described as the key 
stakeholder) was engaged. As a result the Global Industry Alliance was 
established in 2009 to bring together the IMO and private shipping companies. It 
has also worked with media to raise awareness of the invasive species issue, 
partnering with the BBC to produce the prize winning “Invaders from the Sea”93 
documentary film.94  The results of these efforts are to be seen in governance 
reforms at global, regional and national levels.95  They have also “created 
substantial economic benefits by promoting the creation of a sizeable ballast 
water treatment industry valued at over $35B and spurring the rapid 
development of innovative technological solutions for the management of ships 
ballast water”.96 This outcome not only fits a number of ocean governance 
objectives such as maintaining productive socio-ecological systems, establishing 
overriding regulatory frameworks and maintaining coherence across 
jurisdictional, space and time frames, it also fits very well with UNDP’s 
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overarching aim of reducing poverty.  
UNDP’s activities also have a further benefit.  While UNDP’s work is not 
particularly focused on the resolution of disputes in the sense traditionally 
understood by lawyers. It does help promote UNCLOS’s objective of maintaining 
peaceful use of the seas.97 The most obvious indications of this are in the way it 
has supported cooperation between otherwise “hostile” states. Examples include 
the successes in the Yellow Sea project referred to earlier and the discussions 
between the USA and Russia on the Beaufort Sea LME.98  It is also seen in the 
cooperation between Angola, Namibia and South Africa on the Benguela Current 
where:  
 
“[t]he ability of the three nations to overcome historical tensions to work 
together for the region’s mutual and sustainable benefit provide hope that 
similar challenges can be overcome to protect the world’s vulnerable 
marine environments.”99 
 
In some cases there is also the possibility that potential conflicts will be reduced 
as a common approach to issues such as boundary delimitation is agreed. It is 
hoped, for example, that this will be one of the outcomes of PEMSEA’s 
Sustainable Development Strategy for South East Asia (SDS-SEA).100  As these 
examples show, UNDP’s approach to ocean governance may not directly engage 
States in seeking solutions to disputes, but its work brings together government 





UNDP’s role in global ocean governance is somewhat complex.  On the one hand 
its work appears to cut across some key ocean governance objectives.  Whereas, 
for example, UNCLOS provides for the allocation of jurisdiction amongst States, 
UNDP focuses on transboundary cooperation and its work tends to transcend 
jurisdictional issues.  Similarly, whereas UNCLOS prioritises optimum utilization 
of fisheries, UNDP’s work is more closely focussed on sustainability, in particular 
sustainable socio-ecological relationships. Depending on one’s perspective this 
may or may not be taken to support implementation of optimum utilization or 
conservation of marine mammals – another of UNCLOS’s objectives.  It is also 
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difficult to see what UNDP’s work has to say to the freedoms of the high seas. If it 
has anything to say, it would appear to be in the context of the restriction on 
fishing found in the obligation to cooperate in the conservation and management 
of marine living resources on the high seas.102 
 
At first sight UNDP also appears to fall short of other, accepted ocean governance 
objectives. Indeed, there are some objectives it clearly does not meet, but these 
are rather few in number.  UNDP does not enforce decisions/regulations, nor 
does it create mechanism for enforcement. The discussion of the fit between 
UNDP activities and other ocean objectives, however, has to be more nuanced.  
For example, while UNDP does not directly define the rules for allocation of 
power, resources and benefits, its work is designed to support these objectives. 
UNDP may be viewed as overseeing the allocation of power to particular 
decision-making mechanisms, rather than to particular actors. Thus it moves 
decision making into the TDA/SAP process, for example, and away from the 
purview of States acting on an individual basis. The same type of comments can 
be made in relation to the allocation of resources.  While UNDP is not directly 
involved in their allocation its work supporting LME projects creates space for 
allocation activities to take place. Its work in this regard is illustrated by, for 
example, the reduction of fishing effort agreed through the Yellow Sea LME SAP.  
 
UNDP is also active in the creation of policies and regulatory frameworks and the 
establishment of overriding principles and objectives, yet as noted above, its 
work does not appear terribly often in legal literature on ocean governance. This 
may be because its focus is largely on supporting the development of soft law 
agreements in the form of the SAP. These may serve as the precursor to the 
development of binding treaties such as the Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean, or the establishment of more formal institutions such as the Benguela 
Current Commission.  There is, however, a certain distance between the creation 
of such formal laws and institutions and UNDP’s activities and this distance at 
times obscures sight of UNDP’s role. The same can be said of UNDP’s activities at 
the global level.  While it is a key partner in GloBallast, for example, the actual 
development of an international treaty fell under the IMO’s remit rather than 
UNDP’s. Those seeking signs of an agency generating overriding principles and 
objectives to support productive socio-ecological systems, may therefore be 
disappointed in UNDP.  Such a focus would, however, miss the important 
supporting role that UNDP plays in the generation of national, regional and 
global laws and policies. This is a role that can and does lead to the 
harmonisation of policies across States. For example, by encouraging States to 
follow the TDA/SAP process in setting up LME arrangements, UNDP ensures that 
an environment in which consensus around particular norms can emerge exists. 
In so doing it facilitates the production of regional policies and legal instruments 
and helps ensure that ecosystems are consistently managed across jurisdictional 
scales. In playing this supporting role UNDP can be said to active in the creation 
of oceans governance policies and law as well as in ensuring coherence across 
jurisdictional, space and time scales. 
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There are other areas in which the fit between UNDP’s activities and global 
ocean governance objectives is clearer. The TDA/SAP process is, for example, 
designed to support the fair representation of societal interests. UNDP also 
supports participation by developing States in relevant treaties. By engaging a 
range of stakeholders in the production and implementation of the TDA/SAP and 
supporting States to engage with wider regional and global initiatives, UNDP 
helps engender increasing understanding of alternative perspectives. This 
increased understanding helps promote harmonisation of societal interests. 
UNDP’s activities promoting harmonisation within sectors are most clearly seen 
in the GloBallast project.  They are also evident in the LME SAPs where a 
consistent approach may be encouraged to, for example, particular fisheries as 
happens in the Humboldt Current LME in relation to Peruvian anchovy. Where a 
range of sectors are engaged, UNDP’s actions go further and also support cross-
sectoral harmonisation.  
 
There are also some areas where the fit between UNDP’s activities and ocean 
governance is strong. The TDA/SAP processes rest on the monitoring and 
assessment of problems.  These form the cornerstone of its activities and the 
foundation on which it can promote harmonisation of perspectives and the 
development of policies and laws. Similarly, the TDA/SAP process is designed to 
facilitate capacity building – an objective that matches strongly to UNDP’s focus 
on helping “countries achieve the simultaneous eradication of poverty and 
significant reduction of inequalities and exclusion.”103  The TDA/SAP process 
also strongly supports capacity building and the creation of systems that 
maintain the capacity to learn and change. Often times there are also links 
between the TDA/SAP process and wider governance regimes, with the LME 
TDA/SAP process supporting the implementation of global obligations and 
UNDP supporting the participation of States in those wider regimes. 
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